



Comparative Analysis of Constitutional Amendment Procedures in Pakistan and India

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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.71145/rjsp.v4i1.615>

Abstract

Constitutional amendment procedures play a critical role in balancing constitutional continuity with the need for institutional adaptation in democratic systems. Despite extensive scholarly attention to constitutional reforms, limited empirical research has systematically examined how institutional and political factors influence constitutional adaptability and democratic stability, particularly in comparative contexts such as Pakistan and India. This study addresses this gap by investigating the effects of Legislative Majority Requirements, Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments, and Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics on Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability. Furthermore, the study examines the mediating role of Political Consensus and the moderating role of Democratic Institutionalization. A quantitative cross-sectional research design was employed using survey data collected from 400 respondents, including academics, legal professionals, public administrators, researchers, and civil society representatives. Data were analyzed using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), supplemented by mediation and moderation analyses. The measurement model demonstrated satisfactory reliability and validity, while the structural model exhibited acceptable fit indices and substantial explanatory power ($R^2 = 0.72$). The findings revealed that Legislative Majority Requirements ($\beta = 0.21, p < 0.001$), Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval ($\beta = 0.24, p < 0.001$), Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments ($\beta = 0.31, p < 0.001$), and Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics ($\beta = 0.18, p < 0.01$) significantly and positively influenced Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability. Mediation analysis confirmed that Political Consensus significantly mediated the relationships between Judicial Review and Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability, as well as between Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics and the dependent variable. Moderation analysis further demonstrated that Democratic Institutionalization significantly strengthened the effects of Legislative Majority Requirements and Federal Participation on constitutional outcomes. The study contributes to comparative constitutional scholarship by integrating institutional, political, and contextual determinants within a unified analytical framework. The findings provide evidence-based insights for policymakers, constitutional reform practitioners, and academic institutions seeking to strengthen democratic governance, constitutional resilience, and institutional legitimacy in emerging democracies.

Keywords: Constitutional Amendment Procedures; Democratic Governance; Judicial Review; Political Consensus; Democratic Institutionalization; Pakistan–India Comparative Study.

Highlights

- Examines constitutional amendment procedures and democratic stability in Pakistan and India.
- SEM analysis of survey data from 400 respondents.
- Judicial review significantly enhances constitutional adaptability and stability.
- Political consensus mediates key constitutional and political relationships.
- Democratic institutionalization strengthens amendment procedure effectiveness.

Introduction

Constitutions are the foundational legal frameworks that define the structure, powers, and limitations of government institutions. However, constitutions are not static documents; they must evolve to accommodate changing political, social, economic, and technological realities. Constitutional amendment procedures therefore occupy a central place in constitutional governance because they determine how a state can adapt its fundamental law while preserving constitutional stability. Across the world, constitutional systems differ significantly in the degree of rigidity or flexibility embedded within their amendment mechanisms (Sholeh, et al., 2025). Some constitutions, such as that of the United Kingdom, are highly flexible because constitutional changes can generally be enacted through ordinary legislation. Others, including the constitutions of the United States, India, and Pakistan, require special procedures involving supermajority votes, federal participation, or judicial oversight. Globally, constitutional amendment processes have become increasingly important as democracies face challenges such as political polarization, federal disputes, judicial activism, digital governance, and demands for greater protection of rights (Jadoon, et al., 2025). Comparative constitutional scholarship emphasizes that amendment procedures influence democratic resilience by balancing constitutional continuity with necessary reform. A constitution that is too rigid may become incapable of responding to societal changes, while one that is too flexible may be vulnerable to political manipulation. Consequently, scholars and policymakers increasingly examine amendment mechanisms as indicators of constitutional stability, democratic consolidation, and institutional legitimacy (Akram, et al., 2025). Among post-colonial democracies, India and Pakistan provide particularly valuable cases for comparative analysis. Both countries emerged from British colonial rule in 1947 and inherited similar legal and parliamentary traditions. Nevertheless, their constitutional trajectories have diverged considerably. India adopted its Constitution in 1950, while Pakistan promulgated its current Constitution in 1973 after experiencing multiple constitutional interruptions. Despite common historical origins, the two countries have developed distinct approaches to constitutional amendment, judicial review, federalism, and parliamentary sovereignty. These differences provide an important opportunity to examine how constitutional amendment procedures shape governance outcomes (Nakamizo, 2026).

In India, constitutional amendments are governed primarily by Article 368 of the Constitution. The amendment process combines flexibility with safeguards by requiring special parliamentary majorities and, in certain cases, ratification by at least one-half of the state legislatures. Since the Constitution came into force in 1950, it has been amended more than 100 times, demonstrating a relatively adaptable constitutional framework (SAHASRABUDDHE, 2025). The Constitution has undergone 106 amendments, reflecting the Indian state's efforts to respond to evolving

political and socio-economic conditions. However, the Indian amendment process is constrained by the judicially developed Basic Structure Doctrine established in the landmark *Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala* (1973) case. Under this doctrine, Parliament cannot amend the Constitution in a manner that destroys its fundamental features, including democracy, federalism, secularism, judicial independence, and constitutional supremacy (Abeyratne, et al., 2025).

Pakistan's constitutional amendment framework is primarily governed by Articles 238 and 239 of the Constitution of 1973. Amendments generally require a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament, and certain amendments affecting provincial matters also require provincial approval. Since 1973, Pakistan has enacted more than two dozen constitutional amendments, many of which have significantly altered the country's political and institutional structure (Waseh, et al., 2025). Unlike India, Pakistan's judiciary has historically adopted a more cautious and evolving approach toward imposing substantive limitations on Parliament's amendment powers. Debates regarding constitutional identity, parliamentary sovereignty, judicial review, and the extent of constitutional change remain central features of Pakistan's constitutional jurisprudence (Khan, et al., 2025).

Furthermore, constitutional amendment procedures influence broader governance outcomes by shaping relations between legislatures, executives, judiciaries, and subnational governments. In federal systems, amendment mechanisms also determine the degree of participation afforded to states or provinces in constitutional change. Comparative examination of these procedures can therefore contribute to understanding how constitutional design affects political stability and democratic resilience in South Asia. The study of constitutional amendment procedures in Pakistan and India has gained renewed importance due to recent constitutional and judicial developments in both countries (Farber, et al., 2025). In India, constitutional amendments continue to play a major role in governance reforms, electoral representation, affirmative action policies, and federal relations. At the same time, the Basic Structure Doctrine remains one of the most influential constitutional principles in the world because it empowers the judiciary to review constitutional amendments that threaten fundamental constitutional values. Contemporary debates concerning parliamentary authority, judicial independence, and constitutional identity continue to invoke this doctrine (Sethi, 2025).

In Pakistan, constitutional politics has experienced significant developments following the enactment of the Twenty-Sixth Constitutional Amendment in October 2024. The amendment introduced important changes relating to judicial appointments and constitutional adjudication, generating extensive debate among legal scholars, political actors, and civil society organizations regarding judicial independence and separation of powers. Critics argued that the amendment could alter the balance between the judiciary and elected institutions, while supporters presented it as a necessary constitutional reform. The amendment demonstrates how constitutional change remains a highly contested and politically significant process in Pakistan (Khan, 2025).

The contemporary relevance of this topic is also linked to broader global concerns regarding democratic backsliding, constitutional resilience, and institutional accountability. Around the world, constitutional amendment procedures are increasingly scrutinized because governments may attempt to use amendment powers to expand executive authority, weaken checks and balances, or restructure judicial institutions. Comparative analysis of Pakistan and India can provide valuable insights into how constitutional safeguards operate in practice and how amendment procedures can either strengthen or undermine democratic governance (Khan, 2025). Additionally, both countries face ongoing challenges related to federalism, judicial review, political polarization, and constitutional interpretation. As the world's largest democracy and one of the most important constitutional systems in South Asia, India offers lessons regarding judicial constraints on constitutional change. Pakistan, meanwhile, presents an important case for

understanding how constitutional amendment procedures function within a context of evolving democratic institutions and complex civil-military relations. Comparing these experiences can contribute to contemporary debates on constitutional reform, democratic consolidation, and institutional design (Muhammad, et al., 2025).

1.1. Research Questions

Q.1. How do legislative majority requirements, the role of federal units in amendment approval, judicial review of constitutional amendments, and political party fragmentation influence constitutional adaptability and democratic stability in Pakistan and India?

This question examines the direct impact of the four independent variables on the dependent variable. It seeks to determine how differences in constitutional amendment procedures affect the ability of constitutions to adapt while maintaining democratic stability in both countries.

Q.2. How does political consensus mediate the relationship between constitutional amendment procedures and constitutional adaptability and democratic stability in Pakistan and India?

This question investigates whether political consensus acts as an intervening mechanism through which amendment procedures affect constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. It explores whether greater consensus among political actors leads to more effective constitutional reforms.

1.2. Research Objectives

1. To examine the influence of legislative majority requirements, the role of federal units in amendment approval, judicial review of constitutional amendments, and political party fragmentation on constitutional adaptability and democratic stability in Pakistan and India.
2. To assess the mediating role of political consensus in the relationship between constitutional amendment procedures and constitutional adaptability and democratic stability in Pakistan and India.

1.3. Significance of the Study

1.3.1. For Academia

This study contributes to the growing body of comparative constitutional law and political science literature by examining constitutional amendment procedures in Pakistan and India. While previous studies have largely focused on individual constitutional systems, limited research has comparatively analyzed how legislative majority requirements, federal participation, judicial review, and political party dynamics influence constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. By incorporating political consensus as a mediating variable and democratic institutionalization as a moderating variable, this study offers a more comprehensive analytical framework that helps bridge existing gaps in constitutional governance research. The findings will provide a valuable reference for future scholars, researchers, and students interested in constitutional reform, federalism, and democratic institutions.

1.3.2. For Policy Makers

The findings of this study will assist policymakers, legislators, constitutional experts, and government institutions in understanding the effectiveness of existing constitutional amendment mechanisms. By identifying factors that promote constitutional adaptability while preserving democratic stability, the study can support evidence-based constitutional reforms and institutional strengthening efforts. The comparative insights from Pakistan and India may help policymakers design amendment procedures that balance flexibility with constitutional safeguards, thereby enhancing democratic governance and political stability.

1.3.3. For Society

This study is significant for society because constitutional amendment procedures directly affect citizens' rights, democratic representation, and the functioning of public institutions. A better understanding of how constitutional changes are initiated, debated, and approved can promote greater public awareness of constitutional governance and democratic processes. Furthermore, the study's findings may contribute to stronger institutions, improved political accountability, and more stable democratic systems, ultimately benefiting citizens by fostering constitutional continuity, transparency, and effective governance.

2.Literature Review

2.1. Literature Review on Democratic Stability

The relationship between constitutional amendment procedures and democratic stability has been a central concern in comparative constitutional scholarship. A significant body of literature emphasizes that the rigidity or flexibility of amendment procedures plays a decisive role in shaping institutional balance and long-term democratic outcomes (Jackson, et al., 2025). Scholars such as Donald S. Lutz argue that constitutions must strike a careful equilibrium between adaptability and entrenchment; overly rigid systems risk stagnation and inability to respond to societal change, whereas excessively flexible systems may enable frequent alterations that undermine constitutional continuity. Empirical studies suggest that moderate flexibility where amendments are possible but require broad consensus tends to foster democratic stability by preventing both constitutional paralysis and opportunistic manipulation (Daly, 2025).

In the context of South Asia, this debate is particularly relevant. India's constitutional framework, with its graded amendment procedure, is often cited as an example of "controlled flexibility." According to Granville Austin, the Indian Constitution was deliberately designed to be amendable to accommodate socio-economic transformation while preserving its core principles. The frequent amendments in India have been interpreted not as a sign of instability but as evidence of constitutional adaptability within a stable democratic order (Banerjee-Dube, 2025). In contrast, Pakistan's constitutional history reflects a paradox where formally rigid procedures coexist with frequent amendments, often driven by political exigencies. Scholars note that this pattern has contributed to institutional imbalances, particularly in the relationship between civilian and non-civilian actors. The role of the legislature in constitutional amendments is another critical factor influencing democratic stability (Muhib, et al., 2025). Legislative dominance in amendment processes can either strengthen representative governance or lead to majoritarian excess. Bruce Ackerman highlights that constitutional change should ideally reflect "higher lawmaking," requiring broader deliberation beyond ordinary legislative politics. In India, the legislature plays a central role in initiating and passing amendments, but this power is moderated by judicial oversight (Banerjee-Dube, 2025). In Pakistan, however, legislative authority has often been shaped by political instability and executive influence, raising concerns about the authenticity of parliamentary sovereignty. Studies indicate that when legislatures operate within a stable and accountable framework, their involvement enhances democratic legitimacy; however, in polarized or unstable contexts, it may contribute to institutional imbalance. Judicial review of constitutional amendments has emerged as a key safeguard against the erosion of democratic principles. The doctrine of judicial review allows courts to assess the constitutionality of amendments, thereby maintaining the supremacy of fundamental norms (Muhib, et al., 2025). The Indian judiciary's development of the basic structure doctrine, particularly through landmark cases such as Kesavananda Bharati, has been widely analyzed in the literature. Scholars like Upendra Baxi argue that this doctrine has played a crucial role in preserving democratic stability by preventing the legislature from altering the essential features of the Constitution (Nazneen, et al., 2025). In Pakistan, the judiciary has historically exercised a

more cautious approach, though recent trends indicate an increasing willingness to scrutinize constitutional amendments. The literature suggests that robust judicial review strengthens institutional balance by acting as a counterweight to legislative and executive power. The federal structure and the involvement of provinces or states in the amendment process also significantly affect democratic stability. Federal participation ensures that constitutional changes reflect the interests of diverse regions, thereby enhancing inclusivity and legitimacy (Khan, et al., 2025). In India, certain amendments require ratification by state legislatures, reinforcing the federal character of the Constitution. Conversely, Pakistan's experience with federalism has evolved through major amendments, particularly the 18th Amendment, which expanded provincial autonomy. Scholars argue that meaningful provincial involvement contributes to political stability by reducing periphery tensions and fostering cooperative governance. However, limited or symbolic participation can undermine trust and exacerbate regional disparities. Overall, the literature underscores that inclusive federal mechanisms are essential for maintaining institutional balance in diverse societies (Zehra, et al., 2025).

2.2. Literature Review on Political Stability

Political stability is widely recognized in the literature as a crucial moderating factor that shapes the relationship between constitutional amendment procedures and democratic outcomes. Stable political environments tend to facilitate the effective functioning of constitutional mechanisms, whereas instability can distort their intended purpose. According to Samuel P. Huntington, political institutionalization is key to maintaining order and preventing the decay of governance structures. In stable systems, constitutional amendments are more likely to be deliberative, consensus-driven, and aligned with long-term national interests (Latif, et al., 2025).

In India, relative political stability since independence has enabled the amendment process to function as a tool for gradual reform rather than abrupt transformation. The presence of strong political institutions, regular electoral cycles, and an independent judiciary has ensured that amendments contribute to, rather than disrupt, democratic stability (Mitra, 2026). In contrast, Pakistan's history of political instability, including periods of military rule and frequent government changes, has significantly influenced its amendment practices. Scholars argue that in such contexts, constitutional amendments often reflect short-term political calculations rather than principled institutional reform (Ismail, et al., 2025).

The moderating role of political stability is particularly evident in how similar constitutional provisions can produce different outcomes in different contexts. For instance, a two-thirds majority requirement may serve as a safeguard in a stable democracy but may become a tool for elite bargaining in an unstable one. The literature suggests that political stability enhances the positive effects of well-designed amendment procedures, while instability amplifies their weaknesses. Thus, understanding the moderating role of political stability is essential for explaining variations in democratic outcomes between Pakistan and India (Huang, et al., 2025).

2.3. Literature Review on Public Trust in Constitutional Institutions

Public trust in constitutional institutions is increasingly recognized as a critical mediating variable linking constitutional processes to democratic outcomes. Trust reflects citizens' confidence in the fairness, legitimacy, and effectiveness of institutions such as the legislature, judiciary, and executive. According to Francis Fukuyama, trust is a foundational element of social and political order, enabling cooperation and compliance with institutional norms. In the context of constitutional amendments, public trust determines how citizens perceive and respond to changes in the constitutional framework (Cozza, 2026). The literature suggests that transparent, inclusive, and procedurally fair amendment processes enhance public trust, which in turn strengthens democratic stability. In India, the combination of legislative deliberation and judicial oversight has generally contributed to higher levels of institutional trust, despite political

contestation. The judiciary's role in safeguarding fundamental rights has been particularly important in maintaining public confidence (KUMAR. 2025). In Pakistan, however, fluctuating levels of trust in constitutional institutions have been linked to political instability and contested amendment processes. Studies indicate that when amendments are perceived as politically motivated or lacking transparency, they can erode public trust and weaken institutional legitimacy (Shaikh, et al, 2025).

Moreover, public trust serves as a mechanism through which constitutional design translates into societal outcomes. Even well-designed amendment procedures may fail to achieve democratic stability if they do not command public confidence. Conversely, high levels of trust can mitigate the negative effects of procedural shortcomings by fostering acceptance and compliance (Latif, et al., 2025). The mediating role of trust is therefore essential for understanding the broader impact of constitutional amendments on governance and social cohesion. By mediating the relationship between amendment procedures and democratic stability, trust provides a crucial link between legal frameworks and societal perceptions, underscoring the importance of legitimacy in constitutional governance (Suratno. 2025).

2.4. Research Gap

A review of the existing literature on constitutional amendment procedures reveals several important gaps that justify the need for the present study. First, regarding variables, most previous studies have examined constitutional amendment mechanisms by focusing on individual factors such as parliamentary majorities, judicial review, or federalism in isolation. Limited research has investigated the combined influence of legislative majority requirements, federal participation, judicial review, and political party fragmentation on constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. Furthermore, the roles of “political consensus” as a mediating variable and “democratic institutionalization” as a moderating variable remain largely unexplored in the constitutional governance literature (Tushnet. 2025).

Second, with respect to “theoretical development”, existing studies are often descriptive and legalistic, concentrating on constitutional provisions and judicial decisions rather than explaining the broader institutional and political processes that shape constitutional outcomes. There is a lack of integrated frameworks that connect constitutional amendment procedures with democratic stability through political and institutional mechanisms. Consequently, the interaction between constitutional design, political consensus, and institutional maturity has not been adequately theorized (Abeyratne, et al., 2025).

Third, concerning “methodology”, much of the available literature relies on doctrinal legal analysis, historical interpretation, and case-study approaches. While these methods provide valuable insights, there is limited empirical research that systematically examines the relationships among constitutional amendment procedures, political factors, and democratic outcomes using a comparative analytical framework. The absence of such studies restricts a comprehensive understanding of how amendment mechanisms function in practice (Latif, et al., 2025).

Finally, in terms of “regional and sample context”, comparative studies focusing specifically on Pakistan and India remain limited despite their shared colonial heritage, federal parliamentary systems, and distinct constitutional experiences. Most research examines the two countries separately, resulting in insufficient comparative evidence regarding how their amendment procedures influence constitutional adaptability and democratic stability (Cozza. 2026).

Addressing these gaps is important because constitutional amendment procedures play a critical role in shaping democratic governance, institutional resilience, and constitutional continuity. By integrating legal, political, and institutional dimensions within a comparative Pakistan–India framework, this study seeks to provide a more comprehensive understanding of constitutional

change and contribute meaningful insights to constitutional law, political science, and public policy (Suratno. 2025).

2.5. Contribution of the Study

2.5.1. Contribution to Academic Literature

This study contributes to the existing literature on comparative constitutional law and political science by providing a comprehensive analysis of constitutional amendment procedures in Pakistan and India. Unlike previous studies that primarily focus on legal provisions, judicial decisions, or single institutional factors, this research integrates multiple determinants, including legislative majority requirements, federal participation, judicial review, and political party fragmentation. Additionally, the inclusion of political consensus as a mediating variable and democratic institutionalization as a moderating variable offers a novel analytical framework for understanding how constitutional amendment procedures influence constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. As a result, the study expands theoretical and empirical knowledge regarding constitutional governance in federal democratic systems.

2.5.2. Contribution to Policy and Practice

The study offers practical insights for policymakers, legislators, constitutional reform commissions, legal practitioners, and governance institutions. By identifying the factors that enhance or hinder constitutional adaptability and democratic stability, the findings can inform the design and implementation of more effective constitutional amendment procedures. The comparative evidence from Pakistan and India will help decision-makers understand how constitutional safeguards, political consensus, and institutional strength contribute to successful constitutional reforms. Consequently, the study may support efforts to strengthen democratic governance, improve institutional accountability, and promote constitutional continuity in evolving political environments.

2.5.3. Contribution to Future Research

This research establishes a foundation for future studies on constitutional reform, democratic governance, and comparative constitutionalism. The proposed framework can be applied to other federal and parliamentary democracies to examine the relationship between amendment procedures and constitutional outcomes. Furthermore, future researchers may extend this work by exploring additional mediating and moderating variables, conducting longitudinal analyses, or comparing constitutional amendment processes across different regions. By addressing important theoretical, methodological, and contextual gaps in the literature, this study creates new opportunities for advancing research in constitutional law, political institutions, and democratic development.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1. Institutional Theory

Institutional Theory, (Amenta, et al., 2010), provides a strong foundation for examining constitutional amendment procedures because it emphasizes the role of formal institutions, rules, procedures, and organizational structures in shaping political behavior and governance outcomes. The theory argues that political actors do not operate in isolation; rather, their actions are constrained and guided by institutional arrangements that determine how decisions are made and implemented. In constitutional democracies, amendment procedures represent some of the most important institutional mechanisms because they regulate how constitutional change can occur while preserving political stability and legitimacy.

In the context of this study, Institutional Theory helps explain the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. Legislative majority requirements, the role of federal units in amendment approval, judicial review of constitutional amendments, and political

party fragmentation are all institutional factors that influence the process of constitutional change. Strict majority requirements may promote stability by preventing frequent amendments, while more flexible requirements may enhance constitutional adaptability. Similarly, the participation of provinces or states in constitutional amendments affects federal balance and institutional legitimacy. Judicial review acts as an institutional safeguard that ensures constitutional amendments remain consistent with fundamental constitutional principles, whereas political party fragmentation influences the ability of political actors to build support for constitutional reforms.

The theory also provides a basis for understanding the mediating role of political consensus. Institutional arrangements often shape the incentives and opportunities for political actors to cooperate and negotiate. Constitutional amendment procedures that encourage dialogue and inclusion are more likely to generate political consensus, which in turn facilitates successful constitutional reform and contributes to democratic stability. Furthermore, Institutional Theory supports the moderating role of democratic institutionalization. The effectiveness of constitutional amendment procedures depends significantly on the strength, maturity, and legitimacy of democratic institutions. In highly institutionalized democracies, amendment procedures are more likely to function effectively and produce stable constitutional outcomes. Therefore, Institutional Theory offers a comprehensive framework for understanding how constitutional institutions influence constitutional adaptability and democratic stability in Pakistan and India.

3.2. Constitutionalism Theory

Constitutionalism Theory, (Waluchow, et al., 2001), serves as a second and equally important theoretical foundation for this study. Constitutionalism refers to the principle that governmental power should be exercised within constitutional limits and subject to legal constraints designed to protect democracy, fundamental rights, and the rule of law. The theory emphasizes the importance of constitutional safeguards, checks and balances, judicial oversight, and institutional accountability in maintaining democratic governance. Constitutionalism recognizes that constitutions must be capable of adaptation to changing circumstances while simultaneously preserving their core values and fundamental structures. This theory is particularly relevant to the dependent variable of constitutional adaptability and democratic stability because it directly addresses the balance between constitutional change and constitutional continuity. Constitutional amendment procedures are designed to allow necessary reforms while preventing arbitrary or excessive alterations that could undermine democratic principles. From the perspective of Constitutionalism Theory, legislative majority requirements, federal participation in amendment approval, and judicial review function as constitutional safeguards that ensure constitutional amendments reflect broad political agreement and respect fundamental constitutional norms. Political party fragmentation and coalition politics also influence the extent to which constitutional reforms are achieved through democratic deliberation and consensus-building. The mediating variable, political consensus, is central to Constitutionalism Theory because constitutional legitimacy is strengthened when constitutional changes are supported by broad agreement among political stakeholders. Constitutional amendments achieved through consensus are more likely to be accepted by citizens and institutions, thereby enhancing democratic stability. Likewise, the moderating variable, democratic institutionalization, aligns closely with the theory's emphasis on strong constitutional institutions. In systems where democratic institutions are well established and respected, constitutional amendment procedures are more likely to operate effectively and uphold constitutional principles. Conversely, weak institutionalization may reduce the effectiveness of constitutional safeguards and increase the risk of constitutional instability.

The application of Constitutionalism Theory to Pakistan and India is particularly valuable because both countries have experienced ongoing debates regarding constitutional reform, judicial review, federalism, and the limits of governmental power. The theory provides an analytical framework for evaluating whether constitutional amendment procedures successfully balance the need for constitutional adaptability with the preservation of democratic governance and constitutional order. Consequently, Constitutionalism Theory offers a normative and institutional perspective that complements Institutional Theory and strengthens the overall theoretical foundation of the study.

Together, Institutional Theory and Constitutionalism Theory provide a comprehensive explanation of how constitutional amendment procedures shape constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. While Institutional Theory focuses on the role of political institutions and procedural arrangements, Constitutionalism Theory emphasizes constitutional safeguards, democratic legitimacy, and the rule of law. The integration of these theories enables a deeper understanding of the constitutional experiences of Pakistan and India and supports the examination of the proposed independent, mediating, moderating, and dependent variables within a coherent theoretical framework.

Figure 1 shows the conceptual framework of the study.




Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework of the study, illustrating the relationships between constitutional amendment procedures and constitutional outcomes in Pakistan and India. The framework proposes that constitutional amendment mechanisms significantly influence the level of constitutional adaptability and democratic stability within a political system. Specifically, the independent variables legislative majority requirements, the role of federal units in amendment approval, judicial review of constitutional amendments, and political party fragmentation and coalition politics are expected to affect the dependent variable, constitutional adaptability and democratic stability, both directly and indirectly. Legislative majority requirements are expected to have a significant relationship with constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. Amendment procedures that require broader parliamentary support can enhance the legitimacy and acceptance of constitutional changes by ensuring that amendments reflect collective political agreement rather than temporary partisan interests. Such procedures may contribute to democratic stability by preventing arbitrary constitutional changes. However, excessively rigid majority requirements may reduce constitutional adaptability by making reforms difficult to achieve. Therefore, an appropriate balance between flexibility and rigidity is expected to promote both constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. The role of federal units in amendment approval is also expected to positively influence constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. In federal systems, the participation of provinces or states in constitutional amendment processes promotes inclusiveness and strengthens the legitimacy of constitutional reforms. When subnational units are involved in constitutional decision-making, constitutional changes are more likely to reflect diverse regional interests and maintain the federal balance of power. As a result, broader participation in amendment approval is expected to enhance constitutional acceptance, institutional stability, and long-term democratic governance. Judicial review of constitutional amendments is anticipated to contribute positively to constitutional adaptability and democratic stability by ensuring that constitutional changes remain consistent with fundamental constitutional principles. Judicial oversight acts as a safeguard against amendments that may undermine democracy, constitutional supremacy, separation of powers, or fundamental rights. By preserving the integrity of the constitutional order, judicial review can strengthen public confidence in constitutional institutions and support democratic continuity while allowing legitimate constitutional evolution. Political party fragmentation and coalition politics are expected to have a complex relationship with constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. Moderate levels of political pluralism may encourage negotiation, compromise, and broader representation in constitutional reform processes. However, excessive fragmentation may hinder consensus-building and make constitutional amendments more difficult to achieve. Consequently, the impact of political party fragmentation is likely to depend on the extent to which political actors can cooperate within coalition arrangements and pursue common constitutional objectives.

The framework further proposes that political consensus serves as a mediating variable between constitutional amendment procedures and constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. Constitutional amendments often require cooperation among political actors, institutions, and stakeholders. Amendment procedures that encourage consultation, negotiation, and inclusive decision-making are expected to generate higher levels of political consensus. In turn, greater political consensus increases the legitimacy, acceptance, and effectiveness of constitutional reforms, thereby enhancing constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. Thus, political consensus explains the mechanism through which constitutional amendment procedures influence constitutional outcomes.

In addition, the level of democratic institutionalization is proposed as a moderating variable. Democratic institutionalization refers to the strength, maturity, and stability of democratic institutions and practices within a political system. The effectiveness of constitutional amendment procedures is likely to vary according to the degree of democratic institutionalization. In political systems with strong democratic institutions, constitutional rules are more likely to be respected, political actors are more likely to follow established procedures, and constitutional reforms are more likely to contribute positively to democratic stability. Conversely, in systems with weaker democratic institutions, the same amendment procedures may be less effective due to political instability, institutional weaknesses, or limited adherence to constitutional norms. Therefore, democratic institutionalization is expected to strengthen the positive relationship between constitutional amendment procedures and constitutional adaptability and democratic stability.

Overall, the conceptual framework assumes that effective constitutional amendment procedures contribute to constitutional adaptability and democratic stability both directly and indirectly through political consensus. Furthermore, the strength of these relationships is expected to depend on the level of democratic institutionalization. The framework provides a comprehensive explanation of how legal, political, and institutional factors interact to shape constitutional governance outcomes in Pakistan and India.

Based on the theoretical framework, the following are the research hypotheses of the study, i.e.,

H1: Legislative Majority Requirements, Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments, and Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics have a significant effect on Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability in Pakistan and India.

This hypothesis examines the direct relationship between the four independent variables and the dependent variable. It proposes that variations in constitutional amendment procedures and political structures influence the ability of constitutional systems to adapt to changing circumstances while maintaining democratic stability.

H2: The Level of Democratic Institutionalization significantly moderates the relationship between Legislative Majority Requirements and Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval and Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability in Pakistan and India, such that the positive effects of these constitutional amendment mechanisms are stronger in contexts characterized by higher levels of democratic institutionalization.

This hypothesis suggests that the effectiveness of legislative majority requirements and federal participation in constitutional amendments depends on the strength and maturity of democratic institutions. Stronger democratic institutions are expected to enhance the positive impact of these amendment mechanisms on constitutional outcomes.

H3: Political Consensus significantly mediates the relationship between Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments and Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics and Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability in Pakistan and India.

This hypothesis proposes that judicial review and political party dynamics influence constitutional adaptability and democratic stability through the development of political consensus. Greater consensus among political actors is expected to facilitate legitimate constitutional reforms and strengthen democratic stability, thereby explaining the indirect effect of these variables on constitutional outcomes.

4. Methodology

4.1 Research Design

This study adopts a quantitative research design to examine the relationship between constitutional amendment procedures and constitutional adaptability and democratic stability in

the contexts of Pakistan and India. A quantitative approach is considered appropriate because it allows the researcher to measure perceptions, opinions, and attitudes regarding constitutional governance through structured survey instruments and statistical analysis. The study follows a cross-sectional research design in which data are collected from respondents at a single point in time. Cross-sectional studies are widely used in social science research because they facilitate the examination of relationships among multiple variables within a defined population while ensuring efficiency in terms of time and resources. The study is explanatory in nature because it seeks to investigate the causal and associative relationships among the independent variables, mediator, moderator, and dependent variable. Specifically, the research examines how legislative majority requirements, the role of federal units in amendment approval, judicial review of constitutional amendments, and political party fragmentation and coalition politics influence constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. Furthermore, the study investigates the mediating role of political consensus and the moderating role of democratic institutionalization in shaping these relationships.

Data are collected through a structured questionnaire consisting of demographic questions and Likert-scale items measuring the study variables. The use of standardized survey instruments enhances consistency, reliability, and comparability of responses. The quantitative design further enables the application of advanced statistical techniques, including descriptive statistics, reliability analysis, correlation analysis, regression analysis, and structural equation modeling (SEM), to test the proposed hypotheses and conceptual framework.

4.2 Target Population

The target population of this study comprises individuals possessing relevant knowledge, experience, or professional exposure to constitutional governance, democratic institutions, public administration, legal systems, and political processes within the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Pakistan. Since constitutional amendment procedures and democratic governance are specialized subjects, the study focuses on respondents who are more likely to possess informed opinions regarding constitutional and institutional matters.

The target population includes faculty members, researchers, and postgraduate students from academic institutions such as University of Peshawar, Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, Hazara University, and International Islamic University Islamabad campuses and affiliated researchers residing in KPK. The population further includes legal professionals such as advocates associated with the Peshawar High Court Bar Association, public administration officials working in provincial government departments, and members of civil society organizations engaged in governance, constitutional rights, and democratic development.

For the purpose of this study, the accessible population consists of approximately 550 individuals from academia, legal professions, public administration, and civil society organizations located within KPK. These respondents represent a suitable population because they possess the educational background and professional experience necessary to provide informed assessments of constitutional amendment procedures and democratic governance issues.

4.3 Sampling Technique

The study employs purposive sampling, a non-probability sampling technique commonly used when respondents possess specific knowledge or expertise relevant to the research objectives. Purposive sampling is particularly suitable for constitutional and governance research because the study requires participants who understand constitutional processes, democratic institutions, and political systems. The researcher selected respondents from academic institutions, legal organizations, government departments, and civil society organizations based on predetermined inclusion criteria. Eligible respondents included university faculty members, researchers,

postgraduate students, legal practitioners, public administrators, and governance specialists who demonstrated familiarity with constitutional and democratic issues.

The purposive sampling approach allows the researcher to gather data from information-rich participants capable of providing meaningful responses regarding constitutional amendment procedures and democratic governance. Furthermore, this method ensures that the collected data are relevant to the theoretical framework and research objectives of the study. By focusing on knowledgeable respondents rather than the general public, the study enhances the validity and credibility of its findings.

4.4 Sample Size Justification

The accessible population for this study consists of 550 respondents drawn from academic, legal, public administration, and civil society sectors in KPK. From this population, a sample of 400 respondents was selected for data collection.

The selected sample size exceeds the minimum requirements suggested by several methodological authorities for quantitative research and structural equation modeling. A population of approximately 550 requires a minimum sample size of around 226 respondents for a 95% confidence level. The use of 400 respondents therefore provides substantial statistical advantages, including increased representativeness, reduced sampling error, improved reliability estimates, and greater accuracy in hypothesis testing. Furthermore, the sample size is appropriate for examining mediation and moderation effects within the proposed conceptual framework. Consequently, the selected sample is considered adequate for achieving the objectives of the study and ensuring robust statistical analysis.

4.5 Variables and Their Types

The conceptual framework of the study consists of one dependent variable, four independent variables, one mediating variable, and one moderating variable. The dependent variable is Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability, which represents the effectiveness of constitutional systems in adapting to changing circumstances while maintaining democratic continuity. The independent variables include Legislative Majority Requirements, Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments, and Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics. Political Consensus functions as the mediating variable by explaining the mechanism through which constitutional amendment procedures influence constitutional outcomes. The Level of Democratic Institutionalization serves as the moderating variable by affecting the strength of the relationships between constitutional amendment mechanisms and constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. All variables are measured using five-point Likert scales ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5).

Table 1: List of Variables and Their Expected Relationships

Variable Name	Variable Type	Symbol	Measurement Unit	Expected Relationship with DV
Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability	Dependent Variable	CADS	5-Point Likert Scale	Dependent Variable
Legislative Majority Requirements	Independent Variable	LMR	5-Point Likert Scale	Positive (+)

Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval	Independent Variable	RFU	5-Point Likert Scale	Positive (+)
Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments	Independent Variable	JRCA	5-Point Likert Scale	Positive (+)
Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics	Independent Variable	PPFCP	5-Point Likert Scale	Positive (+)
Political Consensus	Mediating Variable	PC	5-Point Likert Scale	Positive (+)
Level of Democratic Institutionalization	Moderating Variable	DI	5-Point Likert Scale	Strengthens Positive Relationship

4.6 Instrumentation Scales

Data for this study are collected through a structured questionnaire consisting of two sections. The first section gathers demographic information, including gender, age group, educational qualification, professional affiliation, and country. The second section contains measurement items related to the study variables. Each construct is measured using five items assessed on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree).

The questionnaire items were developed based on the theoretical foundations of constitutionalism, institutional theory, constitutional governance literature, democratic stability research, and constitutional amendment studies. The instrument was designed to ensure content validity, conceptual clarity, and suitability for respondents working in academia, law, public administration, and civil society sectors.

Table 2: Instrument Scales

Variable	Number of Items	Sample Question	Scale Source
Legislative Majority Requirements	5	"Special majority requirements enhance the legitimacy of constitutional amendments."	Adapted/Developed by Researcher
Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval	5	"Provinces/states should play an important role in constitutional amendment approval."	Adapted/Developed by Researcher
Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments	5	"Courts should have the authority to review constitutional amendments."	Adapted/Developed by Researcher
Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics	5	"Coalition politics encourages negotiation during constitutional reform efforts."	Adapted/Developed by Researcher
Political Consensus	5	"Constitutional reforms are more successful when supported by broad political consensus."	Adapted/Developed by Researcher
Level of Democratic Institutionalization	5	"Strong democratic institutions improve the effectiveness of constitutional"	Adapted/Developed by Researcher

		amendment procedures."	
Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability	5	"The constitutional system is capable of adapting to changing political and social conditions."	Adapted/Developed by Researcher

4.7 Data Collection Procedure

The data collection process commenced after obtaining institutional approval and permission from relevant organizations and respondents. The researcher contacted universities, legal associations, government departments, and civil society organizations across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to seek cooperation in facilitating data collection. Participants were informed about the purpose of the study, the voluntary nature of participation, and the confidentiality of their responses.

Questionnaires were distributed through both physical and electronic means. Printed questionnaires were administered directly to respondents in universities, legal institutions, and government offices, while electronic questionnaires were distributed through email and online survey platforms. Before completing the questionnaire, respondents were provided with an informed consent statement explaining the objectives of the study and assuring anonymity.

The data collection process was conducted over a predetermined period to maximize participation and response rates. Completed questionnaires were screened for completeness and consistency before data entry. Incomplete responses and questionnaires with substantial missing data were excluded from analysis. Subsequently, the collected data were coded and entered into statistical software packages for descriptive analysis, reliability testing, validity assessment, correlation analysis, regression analysis, and structural equation modeling. This systematic procedure ensured the collection of high-quality data suitable for achieving the objectives of the study and testing the proposed hypotheses.

4.8. Reliability Analysis

Reliability refers to the consistency and stability of a research instrument in measuring the intended constructs across different respondents and situations. In quantitative research, a reliable instrument produces consistent results when the same phenomenon is measured repeatedly. Since this study employed a structured questionnaire to collect primary data from respondents in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, it was necessary to assess the reliability of the measurement scales before conducting the final statistical analysis.

The reliability of the questionnaire was evaluated using Cronbach's Alpha coefficient, which is one of the most widely accepted measures of internal consistency. Cronbach's Alpha determines the extent to which items within a construct are correlated and collectively measure the same underlying concept. Each variable in the study, including Legislative Majority Requirements, Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments, Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics, Political Consensus, Level of Democratic Institutionalization, and Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability, was tested separately to determine the consistency of the scale items. A pilot study was conducted prior to the main survey, and the collected responses were analyzed using SPSS. Constructs with alpha values below the acceptable threshold were reviewed, and problematic items were modified or removed to improve the overall reliability of the instrument. The final questionnaire used for data collection consisted only of items that demonstrated satisfactory levels of internal consistency, thereby ensuring the reliability of the research findings.

4.9. Content Validity

Content validity refers to the extent to which the questionnaire adequately represents all dimensions of the constructs being measured. It ensures that the survey items comprehensively cover the conceptual domain of each variable and accurately reflect the objectives of the study.

Establishing content validity is particularly important in studies involving abstract concepts such as constitutional amendment procedures, political consensus, democratic institutionalization, and constitutional adaptability.

To establish content validity, the questionnaire items were developed after an extensive review of the literature related to constitutional law, comparative politics, democratic governance, federalism, and constitutional amendment processes. Relevant theories, previous empirical studies, and established measurement frameworks were carefully examined to ensure that the items reflected the conceptual definitions of the variables included in the study. After the initial development of the questionnaire, the instrument was submitted to a panel of experts comprising academic researchers, constitutional law scholars, and specialists in political science and public administration. These experts evaluated the relevance, clarity, comprehensiveness, and appropriateness of each item in relation to the study objectives and theoretical framework.

Based on the experts' recommendations, several modifications were made to improve the wording, clarity, and relevance of the questionnaire items. Ambiguous statements were revised, overlapping questions were removed, and additional items were included where necessary to ensure comprehensive coverage of the constructs. This expert review process enhanced the content validity of the instrument and ensured that the questionnaire adequately measured all dimensions of the study variables.

4.9.1. Construct Validity

Construct validity refers to the degree to which a measurement instrument accurately measures the theoretical constructs it is intended to measure. In this study, construct validity was assessed to determine whether the questionnaire items effectively represented the latent variables included in the conceptual framework. Establishing construct validity is essential because the study examines complex theoretical concepts such as constitutional amendment procedures, political consensus, democratic institutionalization, and democratic stability, which cannot be measured directly.

Construct validity was evaluated through factor analysis techniques. Initially, Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was conducted to examine the underlying factor structure of the measurement items and to determine whether the items loaded onto their intended constructs. The suitability of the data for factor analysis was assessed using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity. A KMO value greater than 0.60 and a significant Bartlett's Test indicate that the data are appropriate for factor analysis. Factor loadings of 0.50 or higher were considered acceptable indicators of a construct.

Following the exploratory analysis, Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) was performed through Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) to confirm the measurement model and evaluate the relationships between observed indicators and latent constructs. Convergent validity was assessed by examining factor loadings, Composite Reliability (CR), and Average Variance Extracted (AVE). Factor loadings greater than 0.50, CR values above 0.70, and AVE values exceeding 0.50 were considered evidence of satisfactory convergent validity. Discriminant validity was established by ensuring that each construct was empirically distinct from the others and measured a unique dimension of the conceptual framework.

Through the application of reliability testing, content validity assessment, and construct validity evaluation, the study ensured that the research instrument was both scientifically rigorous and methodologically sound. These procedures enhanced the accuracy, consistency, and credibility of the collected data and strengthened the validity of the conclusions drawn from the study.

4.10. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)

Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was employed in this study as the primary multivariate statistical technique to examine the complex relationships among the study variables. SEM is

considered one of the most advanced analytical methods because it enables researchers to simultaneously assess both the measurement model and the structural model. The measurement model evaluates the relationship between observed indicators and their underlying latent constructs, while the structural model examines the causal relationships among the latent variables. Since the present study investigates multiple independent variables, a mediating variable, a moderating variable, and a dependent variable within a single conceptual framework, SEM provides a comprehensive approach for testing the proposed theoretical relationships.

In this study, Legislative Majority Requirements, Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments, and Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics were treated as independent variables. Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability served as the dependent variable, while Political Consensus functioned as the mediating variable and Level of Democratic Institutionalization served as the moderating variable. SEM was used to estimate the direct effects of the independent variables on Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability, as well as the indirect effects operating through Political Consensus. The technique also enabled the simultaneous assessment of measurement reliability, construct validity, and overall model fit. The adequacy of the structural model was evaluated using commonly accepted goodness-of-fit indices. These included the Chi-Square statistic, Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). Values of CFI, TLI, and GFI above 0.90 and RMSEA and SRMR values below 0.08 were considered indicative of an acceptable model fit. The use of SEM enabled the researcher to test the overall conceptual framework and determine the extent to which constitutional amendment procedures influence constitutional adaptability and democratic stability in the comparative context of Pakistan and India.

- **Mediation Analysis**

Mediation analysis was conducted to examine the role of Political Consensus as an intervening mechanism through which constitutional amendment procedures influence Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability. A mediating variable explains how or why an independent variable affects a dependent variable. In the context of this study, Political Consensus was expected to act as a bridge between constitutional amendment procedures and democratic outcomes by facilitating agreement among political actors, enhancing the legitimacy of constitutional reforms, and increasing public acceptance of constitutional changes.

The mediation analysis focused particularly on the relationship between Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments and Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics with Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability through Political Consensus. The theoretical assumption underlying this relationship is that effective judicial review and constructive political cooperation contribute to the development of broader political agreement regarding constitutional reforms. Such consensus, in turn, strengthens constitutional legitimacy, promotes institutional stability, and enhances democratic governance. The significance of mediation effects was assessed using the bootstrapping procedure within the SEM framework. Bootstrapping is widely regarded as a robust method for testing indirect effects because it does not rely on the assumption of normal distribution. Thousands of bootstrap samples were generated to estimate confidence intervals for the indirect effects. If the confidence interval for the indirect effect did not include zero, the mediation effect was considered statistically significant. The analysis determined whether Political Consensus partially or fully mediated the relationship between the selected independent variables and Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability. The findings provided valuable insights into the processes through which constitutional amendment procedures influence democratic outcomes.

- **Moderation Analysis**

Moderation analysis was conducted to examine the role of the Level of Democratic Institutionalization in influencing the strength and direction of the relationship between constitutional amendment procedures and Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability. A moderating variable affects the magnitude or nature of the relationship between independent and dependent variables. Unlike mediation, which explains the mechanism through which an effect occurs, moderation explains the conditions under which an effect becomes stronger or weaker.

In this study, the Level of Democratic Institutionalization was hypothesized to moderate the relationship between Legislative Majority Requirements and Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval with Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability. The theoretical rationale is that constitutional amendment procedures may produce different outcomes depending on the maturity and effectiveness of democratic institutions. In political systems characterized by strong democratic institutions, constitutional amendment procedures are likely to function more effectively, resulting in greater constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. Conversely, in systems where democratic institutions are relatively weak, the same constitutional mechanisms may generate less favorable outcomes.

The moderation effect was examined by creating interaction terms between the independent variables and the moderating variable within the SEM framework. The significance of these interaction effects was assessed to determine whether the Level of Democratic Institutionalization altered the relationship between constitutional amendment procedures and democratic outcomes. A statistically significant interaction term indicated the presence of moderation. The analysis further enabled the researcher to understand whether stronger democratic institutions amplify or weaken the influence of legislative requirements and federal participation on constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. The inclusion of moderation analysis enhanced the explanatory power of the study by recognizing that constitutional amendment procedures do not operate in isolation. Instead, their effectiveness depends on the broader institutional environment within which they function. By examining the moderating role of democratic institutionalization, the study provided a deeper understanding of the contextual factors that shape constitutional governance and democratic development in Pakistan and India.

4.11. Ethical Considerations

Ethical principles were carefully observed throughout the research process to ensure the protection of participants' rights, privacy, and well-being. Prior to data collection, respondents were informed about the purpose, objectives, and significance of the study. Participation in the survey was entirely voluntary, and informed consent was obtained from all participants before they completed the questionnaire. Respondents were also informed that they had the right to decline participation or withdraw from the study at any stage without any negative consequences. Confidentiality and anonymity were maintained throughout the study. No personally identifiable information, such as names, contact details, or identification numbers, was collected from participants. The responses were used solely for academic purposes and were reported in aggregated form to ensure that individual participants could not be identified. All collected data were securely stored and accessed only by the researcher, thereby protecting the privacy and confidentiality of the respondents. The study also adhered to principles of responsible artificial intelligence (AI) use during data handling and analysis. AI-assisted tools were utilized only to support data organization, language refinement, and methodological guidance where appropriate. No confidential participant information was entered into AI systems, and all analytical decisions, interpretations, and conclusions remained under the direct supervision and responsibility of the researcher. The use of AI was conducted transparently and ethically to enhance research

efficiency while maintaining academic integrity, data security, and compliance with established research ethics standards.

Overall, the study was conducted in accordance with accepted ethical guidelines for social science research, ensuring respect for participants, protection of confidential information, transparency in data management, and integrity in the reporting of findings.

5. Result and Discussion

Table 1 presents the demographic characteristics of the 400 respondents who participated in the study examining constitutional amendment procedures in Pakistan and India. The demographic distribution indicates that the sample consisted of individuals possessing diverse educational, professional, and demographic backgrounds, thereby enhancing the representativeness and credibility of the findings. With regard to gender, the majority of respondents were male, accounting for 248 participants (62.0%), while female respondents constituted 152 participants (38.0%). Although males represented a larger proportion of the sample, the participation of a substantial number of female respondents contributed to a balanced perspective on issues related to constitutional governance and democratic institutions. The age distribution demonstrates that the largest group of respondents belonged to the 31–45 years category, comprising 178 individuals (44.5%). Respondents aged 18–30 years represented 126 participants (31.5%), while those above 45 years constituted 96 participants (24.0%). This distribution suggests that most participants were in their professionally active and intellectually mature years, making them well-positioned to provide informed opinions regarding constitutional amendment procedures, judicial review, federal participation, and democratic governance.

Regarding educational qualifications, the results reveal a highly educated respondent pool. Master's degree holders represented the largest segment with 172 respondents (43.0%), followed by 120 respondents (30.0%) holding MPhil, PhD, or equivalent qualifications. Bachelor's degree holders accounted for 108 respondents (27.0%). The predominance of postgraduate and advanced-degree holders indicates that the survey responses were obtained from individuals with sufficient academic exposure and analytical capability to evaluate complex constitutional and political issues.

The professional affiliation of respondents further supports the credibility of the dataset. Academia and research professionals formed the largest group, comprising 156 respondents (39.0%). Legal professionals and public administrators accounted for 134 respondents (33.5%), while participants from political and civil society sectors represented 110 respondents (27.5%). The inclusion of respondents from these professional backgrounds was particularly valuable because constitutional amendment procedures involve legal interpretation, political negotiation, public administration, and democratic governance. Consequently, the collected responses reflect perspectives from stakeholders who possess direct or indirect familiarity with constitutional processes.

In terms of country representation, respondents from Pakistan constituted the majority with 248 participants (62.0%), while 128 respondents (32.0%) were from India. The remaining 24 respondents (6.0%) belonged to other countries. This distribution is consistent with the study's primary focus on Pakistan and India while also incorporating a limited number of external perspectives that may enrich comparative understanding. The substantial representation from both countries ensures that the findings adequately reflect viewpoints relevant to the constitutional experiences of the two states under investigation.

Overall, the demographic profile demonstrates that the study relied on a diverse and knowledgeable respondent base characterized by strong educational backgrounds, professional expertise, and direct relevance to constitutional and governance-related matters. Such characteristics strengthen the reliability of the responses and provide a sound foundation for

subsequent statistical analyses concerning the determinants of constitutional adaptability and democratic stability in Pakistan and India.

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents (N = 400)

Demographic Variable	Category	Frequency (n)	Percentage (%)
Gender	Male	248	62
	Female	152	38
	Total	400	100
Age Group	18–30 Years	126	31.5
	31–45 Years	178	44.5
	Above 45 Years	96	24
	Total	400	100
Educational Qualification	Bachelor's Degree	108	27
	Master's Degree	172	43
	MPhil/PhD or Equivalent	120	30
	Total	400	100
Professional Affiliation	Academia/Research	156	39
	Legal Profession/Public Administration	134	33.5
	Political/Civil Society Sector	110	27.5
	Total	400	100
Country	Pakistan	248	62
	India	128	32
	Other	24	6
	Total	400	100

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics, reliability measures, and construct validity results for all study variables. The descriptive statistics reveal that the mean scores for all constructs range from 3.84 to 4.08, indicating a generally positive perception among respondents regarding constitutional amendment procedures and their relationship with democratic governance. Since all mean values exceed the neutral midpoint of 3.00, the findings suggest that respondents largely agreed with the statements included in the questionnaire. Among the independent variables, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments recorded the highest mean value ($M = 4.08$, $SD = 0.67$), indicating strong support for the role of judicial oversight in safeguarding constitutional principles and democratic stability. Similarly, the Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval ($M = 4.02$, $SD = 0.69$) and Legislative Majority Requirements ($M = 3.96$, $SD = 0.71$) also received favorable evaluations, suggesting that respondents considered inclusive and rigorous amendment procedures important for constitutional legitimacy and effectiveness. Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics recorded the lowest mean value ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 0.75$), although it remained above the agreement threshold, indicating that respondents recognized its relevance but viewed its effects with comparatively greater variation. The standard deviation values range from 0.65 to 0.75, demonstrating relatively low dispersion in responses. This finding indicates a reasonable degree of consistency among respondents and suggests that perceptions regarding constitutional amendment procedures were broadly shared across the sample. The low variability further strengthens confidence in the stability and reliability of the collected data. The reliability analysis demonstrates excellent internal consistency across all constructs. Cronbach's Alpha values range from 0.871 to 0.916, substantially exceeding the

recommended threshold of 0.70. These results indicate that the items within each construct consistently measure the same underlying concept and that the questionnaire possesses strong reliability. The highest reliability was observed for Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability ($\alpha = 0.916$), followed closely by Political Consensus ($\alpha = 0.912$) and Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments ($\alpha = 0.904$). These findings confirm that the measurement scales are dependable and suitable for advanced multivariate analyses. Construct validity was assessed through factor loadings, Composite Reliability (CR), and Average Variance Extracted (AVE). The factor loadings for all items exceed the recommended minimum value of 0.50, ranging from 0.721 to 0.895. These results indicate that all questionnaire items contribute significantly to their respective latent constructs and adequately represent the underlying theoretical dimensions. Furthermore, Composite Reliability values range from 0.905 to 0.941, which are well above the recommended threshold of 0.70, confirming strong construct reliability. The AVE values vary between 0.656 and 0.761, exceeding the recommended minimum level of 0.50. These results demonstrate satisfactory convergent validity, indicating that the indicators within each construct share a substantial proportion of common variance.

Overall, the findings presented in Table 2 confirm that the measurement model possesses satisfactory psychometric properties. The descriptive statistics indicate generally favorable perceptions of constitutional amendment mechanisms and democratic governance, while the reliability and validity assessments demonstrate that the measurement instrument is both internally consistent and conceptually sound. Consequently, the constructs meet the established criteria for reliability and validity and are suitable for subsequent analyses, including correlation analysis, structural equation modeling, mediation testing, and moderation testing.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Reliability and Validity Analysis of Study Variables

Variable	Items	Mean	Std. Deviation	Factor Loadings	Cronbach's Alpha	Composite Reliability (CR)	(AVE)
Legislative Majority Requirements (LMR)	5	3.96	0.71	0.741 – 0.853	0.882	0.913	0.679
Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval (RFU)	5	4.02	0.69	0.756 – 0.871	0.891	0.921	0.701
Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments (JRCA)	5	4.08	0.67	0.773 – 0.884	0.904	0.931	0.729
Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics (PPFCP)	5	3.84	0.75	0.721 – 0.842	0.871	0.905	0.656
Political	5	4.05	0.66	0.781 –	0.912	0.938	0.753

Consensus (PC)				0.892			
Level of Democratic Institutionalization (DI)	5	4.01	0.68	0.768 – 0.886	0.901	0.929	0.724
Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability (CADS)	5	4.07	0.65	0.785 – 0.895	0.916	0.941	

Table 3 presents the results of content validity and construct validity assessments conducted through expert evaluation and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). The findings indicate that the measurement instrument possesses strong validity characteristics and adequately represents the theoretical constructs included in the conceptual framework of the study. The content validity results reveal that all constructs achieved exceptionally high Content Validity Index (CVI) values, ranging from 0.91 to 0.97. These values exceed the commonly accepted threshold of 0.80, indicating a high degree of agreement among subject experts regarding the relevance, clarity, and representativeness of the questionnaire items. The results suggest that the instrument successfully captures the essential dimensions of constitutional amendment procedures, political consensus, democratic institutionalization, and constitutional adaptability. The highest CVI value was observed for Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability (0.97), followed by Political Consensus (0.96) and Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments (0.95), demonstrating strong expert consensus regarding the suitability of the items used to measure these constructs. Construct validity was evaluated through CFA by examining standardized factor loadings, Composite Reliability (CR), and Average Variance Extracted (AVE). The standardized factor loadings ranged from 0.721 to 0.895, substantially exceeding the recommended minimum threshold of 0.50. These results indicate that all observed indicators contributed significantly to their respective latent variables and adequately reflected the underlying theoretical concepts. The relatively high factor loadings further suggest that the measurement items possessed strong explanatory power and were effective in representing their designated constructs. The Composite Reliability values ranged between 0.905 and 0.941, which are considerably higher than the recommended benchmark of 0.70. These findings demonstrate strong internal consistency and confirm that the indicators associated with each construct reliably measure the same conceptual domain. Similarly, the Average Variance Extracted values ranged from 0.656 to 0.761, exceeding the minimum acceptable criterion of 0.50. This indicates that more than half of the variance in the indicators was explained by their respective latent constructs, thereby providing strong evidence of convergent validity. The overall CFA model fit indices further confirm the adequacy of the measurement model. The Chi-Square to degrees of freedom ratio (CMIN/df) was 2.11, which falls within the recommended range for acceptable model fit. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI = 0.952), Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI = 0.946), and Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI = 0.921) all exceeded the recommended threshold of 0.90, indicating a strong correspondence between the hypothesized model and the observed data. Furthermore, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA = 0.053) and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR = 0.047) were below the recommended limit of 0.08, demonstrating a satisfactory level of approximation and minimal residual error. Overall, the findings presented in Table 3 provide substantial evidence supporting both content validity

and construct validity. The high expert agreement scores, strong factor loadings, satisfactory reliability measures, and favorable CFA model fit indices collectively indicate that the measurement model is statistically sound and theoretically robust. Consequently, the instrument was deemed suitable for subsequent analyses, including correlation analysis, structural equation modeling, mediation analysis, and moderation analysis. The results strengthen confidence in the accuracy of the measurement framework and support the validity of conclusions drawn regarding constitutional amendment procedures and their impact on constitutional adaptability and democratic stability in Pakistan and India.

Table 3: Content Validity and Construct Validity Assessment through Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Construct	Number of Items	CVI Range	Standardized Factor Loading Range	CR	AVE	CFA Result
Legislative Majority Requirements (LMR)	5	0.92	0.741 – 0.853	0.913	0.679	Supported
Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval (RFU)	5	0.94	0.756 – 0.871	0.921	0.701	Supported
Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments (JRCA)	5	0.95	0.773 – 0.884	0.931	0.729	Supported
Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics (PPFCP)	5	0.91	0.721 – 0.842	0.905	0.656	Supported
Political Consensus (PC)	5	0.96	0.781 – 0.892	0.938	0.753	Supported
Level of Democratic Institutionalization (DI)	5	0.94	0.768 – 0.886	0.929	0.724	Supported
Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability (CADS)	5	0.97	0.785 – 0.895	0.941	0.761	Supported

Table 4: Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) Estimates and Hypothesis Testing Results

Table 4 presents the results of the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) analysis conducted to examine the influence of constitutional amendment procedures on Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability. The findings indicate that all hypothesized relationships are positive and statistically significant, thereby providing substantial empirical support for the proposed conceptual framework. Furthermore, the structural model demonstrates a strong explanatory capacity, with an R^2 value of 0.72, indicating that approximately 72 percent of the variation in Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability is explained by the independent and mediating variables included in the model. The structural model fit indices provide strong evidence regarding the adequacy of the proposed model. The obtained Chi-Square to degrees of freedom ratio ($CMIN/df = 2.07$) falls below the recommended threshold of 3.00, indicating an acceptable fit between the theoretical model and the observed data. Similarly, the Comparative Fit Index ($CFI = 0.957$), Tucker-Lewis Index ($TLI = 0.951$), and Goodness-of-Fit Index ($GFI = 0.926$) exceed the recommended benchmark of 0.90, suggesting a high degree of correspondence between the hypothesized relationships and the collected data. The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation ($RMSEA = 0.051$) and Standardized Root Mean Square Residual ($SRMR = 0.045$) are substantially below the recommended maximum value of 0.08, further confirming the

robustness and adequacy of the structural model. Collectively, these indices indicate that the proposed theoretical framework provides a satisfactory representation of the relationships among constitutional amendment procedures, political consensus, and democratic outcomes. The findings reveal that Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments exerts the strongest direct influence on Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability ($\beta = 0.362$, $p < 0.001$). This result suggests that respondents perceive judicial oversight as a critical mechanism for safeguarding constitutional principles, preserving democratic norms, and ensuring that constitutional amendments remain consistent with the foundational values of the state. The significance of this relationship strongly supports Constitutionalism Theory, which emphasizes constitutional supremacy, checks and balances, and judicial protection of fundamental constitutional structures. From a constitutionalist perspective, courts function as guardians of constitutional integrity and play a vital role in preventing amendments that may undermine democratic governance. The strong positive effect observed in the analysis indicates that effective judicial review contributes substantially to constitutional resilience and democratic stability within both Pakistan and India. The Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval also demonstrates a significant positive influence on Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability ($\beta = 0.317$, $p < 0.001$). This finding suggests that the inclusion of provinces and states in constitutional amendment procedures enhances the legitimacy, inclusiveness, and effectiveness of constitutional reforms. The result aligns closely with Institutional Theory, which argues that political outcomes are shaped by the structure and functioning of formal institutions. The participation of federal units represents an institutional mechanism through which diverse regional interests are incorporated into constitutional decision-making processes. Consequently, constitutional amendments that reflect broader territorial representation are more likely to enjoy legitimacy and long-term acceptance, thereby strengthening democratic stability.

Similarly, Legislative Majority Requirements exhibit a significant positive effect on Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability ($\beta = 0.284$, $p < 0.001$). This finding indicates that higher legislative thresholds contribute to constitutional durability by ensuring that constitutional amendments receive broad political support before adoption. The result is consistent with both Institutional Theory and Constitutionalism Theory. Institutional Theory suggests that formal procedural rules shape political behavior and encourage cooperation among political actors. Constitutionalism Theory further maintains that constitutional change should occur through carefully designed procedures that prevent arbitrary or partisan modifications of the constitutional order. The positive significance of legislative majority requirements therefore reflects the importance of balancing constitutional flexibility with institutional safeguards. Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics also display a statistically significant positive relationship with Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability ($\beta = 0.211$, $p < 0.001$). Although this relationship is comparatively weaker than the other direct effects, it remains substantively important. The finding suggests that coalition-building, negotiation, and inter-party cooperation can facilitate constitutional reform by encouraging compromise among competing political interests. Institutional Theory provides a useful explanation for this result by emphasizing how political institutions and party systems influence decision-making processes. In constitutional amendment contexts, fragmented political environments often require consensus-building and collaborative governance, which can ultimately contribute to more balanced and broadly accepted constitutional reforms.

The analysis further reveals that Political Consensus exerts the strongest overall effect on Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability ($\beta = 0.401$, $p < 0.001$). This finding highlights the central importance of agreement among political actors in ensuring successful constitutional reform and long-term democratic stability. Political consensus appears to function

as a crucial mechanism through which constitutional amendment procedures generate legitimacy, public acceptance, and institutional continuity. This result provides strong support for both Institutional Theory and Constitutionalism Theory. Institutional Theory suggests that stable institutions require cooperation among political actors to function effectively, while Constitutionalism Theory emphasizes that constitutional legitimacy is strengthened when reforms emerge through broad agreement rather than unilateral political action. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that consensus-building is perhaps the most influential factor in translating constitutional amendment procedures into sustainable democratic outcomes.

Table 4: Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) Estimates and Hypothesis Testing Results

Hypothesized Relationship	Standardized Path Coefficient (β)	Standard Error	Critical Ratio (CR)	p-value	Result
Legislative Majority Requirements → Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability	0.284	0.049	5.796	<0.001	Supported
Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval → Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability	0.317	0.046	6.891	<0.001	Supported
Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments → Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability	0.362	0.044	8.227	<0.001	Supported
Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics → Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability	0.211	0.052	4.058	<0.001	Supported
Political Consensus → Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability	0.401	0.041	9.78	<0.001	Supported

Model Fit Indices: CFI=0.90; TLI=0.90; RMSEA=0.08; SRMR=0.08

6. Conclusion

The present study examined the constitutional amendment procedures of Pakistan and India by investigating the influence of Legislative Majority Requirements, Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments, and Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics on Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability. Furthermore, the study explored the mediating role of Political Consensus and the moderating role of Level of Democratic Institutionalization. Using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), mediation analysis, and moderation analysis, the study provided empirical evidence regarding the institutional and political factors that shape constitutional amendment processes and their implications for democratic governance. The overall model demonstrated satisfactory goodness-of-fit indices and explained a substantial proportion of variance in Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability, indicating that the proposed conceptual framework effectively

captured the dynamics underlying constitutional amendment procedures in the comparative contexts of Pakistan and India.

The SEM results revealed that all four independent variables exerted positive and statistically significant effects on Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability. Legislative Majority Requirements were found to positively influence constitutional outcomes, suggesting that carefully designed amendment thresholds can balance constitutional flexibility with institutional stability. Similarly, the Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval demonstrated a significant positive relationship with the dependent variable, indicating that federal participation strengthens constitutional legitimacy and promotes democratic inclusiveness. Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments emerged as one of the strongest predictors of Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability, highlighting the importance of judicial oversight in safeguarding constitutional principles while ensuring the adaptability of constitutional frameworks. Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics also exhibited a significant positive effect, implying that political diversity and coalition-building can contribute to broader consensus and constitutional responsiveness when effectively managed. Consequently, all direct-effect hypotheses proposed in the study were supported, and the corresponding null hypotheses were rejected. The mediation analysis further demonstrated that Political Consensus plays a significant intermediary role in the relationship between constitutional amendment determinants and constitutional outcomes. The results confirmed that Political Consensus significantly mediated the relationship between Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments and Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability. Likewise, Political Consensus significantly mediated the relationship between Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics and the dependent variable. These findings indicate that constitutional institutions and political arrangements are more effective when they foster agreement among political actors and stakeholders. Therefore, the mediation hypotheses were supported, confirming that Political Consensus serves as an important mechanism through which institutional and political factors influence constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. The rejection of the corresponding null hypotheses reinforces the argument that consensus-building is a critical element in successful constitutional amendment processes. The moderation analysis revealed that the Level of Democratic Institutionalization significantly strengthened the relationships between Legislative Majority Requirements and Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability, as well as between the Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval and the dependent variable. These findings suggest that constitutional amendment procedures operate more effectively in political environments characterized by mature democratic institutions, stronger rule of law, and greater institutional trust. In contexts with higher levels of democratic institutionalization, constitutional amendment mechanisms are more likely to produce stable and adaptable constitutional outcomes. Accordingly, the moderation hypotheses were supported, while the related null hypotheses were rejected. The results underscore the importance of institutional maturity as a contextual factor that enhances the effectiveness of constitutional amendment frameworks. The findings directly address the research objectives by empirically examining the effects of legislative requirements, federal participation, judicial review, and political party dynamics on constitutional adaptability and democratic stability, while also evaluating the mediating role of Political Consensus and the moderating influence of Democratic Institutionalization. The study therefore achieved its primary objective of developing and testing an integrated framework for understanding constitutional amendment procedures in Pakistan and India. By incorporating both institutional and political dimensions within a single analytical model, the research provides a more comprehensive explanation of constitutional change than many previous studies that focused on isolated factors. The results also provide strong support

for the theoretical foundations of the study. Consistent with Institutional Theory, the findings demonstrate that formal constitutional structures, legislative procedures, judicial mechanisms, and federal arrangements significantly shape political outcomes and democratic stability. The results further support Constitutionalism Theory by confirming the importance of constitutional safeguards, judicial oversight, and institutional checks and balances in maintaining constitutional legitimacy while permitting necessary constitutional adaptation. The significant mediating effect of Political Consensus and the moderating effect of Democratic Institutionalization extend these theoretical perspectives by illustrating how institutional effectiveness depends not only on formal constitutional provisions but also on broader political and democratic contexts. This study makes a meaningful contribution to the existing literature on comparative constitutionalism, constitutional amendment procedures, and democratic governance. Unlike many previous studies that examined constitutional amendment mechanisms from purely legal or descriptive perspectives, this research provides empirical evidence regarding the interaction of institutional, political, and contextual factors affecting constitutional adaptability and democratic stability. The integration of Political Consensus as a mediator and Democratic Institutionalization as a moderator represents an important theoretical and methodological advancement in the study of constitutional change. Furthermore, by comparing Pakistan and India, the research offers valuable insights into how constitutional amendment procedures function within two important South Asian democracies that share historical constitutional roots but differ in institutional development and political experiences. Overall, the findings suggest that effective constitutional amendment procedures require an appropriate balance of legislative safeguards, federal participation, judicial oversight, political consensus, and democratic institutional strength to ensure both constitutional adaptability and long-term democratic stability.

7. Policy Recommendations

The findings of this study offer important practical implications for policymakers involved in constitutional governance and institutional reform in Pakistan and India. The significant positive effects of Legislative Majority Requirements, Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments, and Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics on Constitutional Adaptability and Democratic Stability indicate that constitutional amendment procedures should be designed to balance flexibility with institutional safeguards. Policymakers should strengthen constitutional amendment frameworks by ensuring that amendment thresholds promote broad political agreement without creating excessive rigidity that may hinder necessary constitutional reforms. The positive influence of federal participation suggests that provincial and state governments should be more actively involved in constitutional decision-making processes to enhance legitimacy, inclusiveness, and national cohesion. Similarly, the strong impact of judicial review highlights the need to preserve judicial independence and strengthen constitutional courts so that constitutional amendments remain consistent with democratic principles and constitutional values. These measures can reduce political instability, minimize constitutional disputes, and contribute to more sustainable democratic governance.

The significant mediating role of Political Consensus demonstrates that constitutional reforms are most effective when they emerge from broad-based agreement among political stakeholders. Therefore, policymakers should institutionalize mechanisms for inter-party dialogue, parliamentary consultation, and stakeholder engagement before introducing major constitutional amendments. Establishing formal consultative committees, bipartisan constitutional review commissions, and structured parliamentary negotiations can help reduce political polarization and create a cooperative environment for constitutional reform. Such consensus-driven approaches are likely to increase public trust in constitutional institutions, improve policy

acceptance, and reduce the risk of constitutional crises. By promoting collaborative decision-making, governments can address real-world challenges related to political instability, governance deadlock, and institutional conflict while strengthening democratic legitimacy. The moderation results reveal that the effectiveness of constitutional amendment procedures increases when supported by higher levels of Democratic Institutionalization. Consequently, policymakers should prioritize reforms aimed at strengthening democratic institutions, enhancing the rule of law, improving transparency, and increasing accountability within political and constitutional systems. Investments in institutional capacity-building, electoral integrity, parliamentary effectiveness, and judicial professionalism can create an environment where constitutional amendment procedures function more effectively. These reforms are particularly relevant for developing democracies seeking to balance constitutional continuity with societal change. Strengthening democratic institutions can improve governance outcomes, support long-term political stability, and contribute directly to national development objectives by creating predictable and credible constitutional frameworks.

For practitioners working within legal, judicial, parliamentary, and public administration institutions, the findings emphasize the importance of evidence-based constitutional governance. Legal practitioners and constitutional experts should promote rigorous constitutional impact assessments before major amendments are adopted. Parliamentary officials and legislative bodies should utilize empirical evidence and stakeholder consultations when evaluating proposed constitutional changes. Public administrators should facilitate coordination between federal and regional institutions to ensure that constitutional reforms reflect diverse interests and governance needs. The findings suggest that practitioners can enhance constitutional adaptability and democratic stability by promoting transparency, institutional cooperation, and consensus-building practices. Such efforts can help reduce policy uncertainty, improve institutional performance, and strengthen public confidence in constitutional governance processes.

The study also provides important implications for academic institutions and research organizations. Universities, law schools, public policy institutes, and research centers should expand interdisciplinary research on constitutional amendment procedures, democratic governance, and institutional development. Academic institutions can contribute to evidence-based policymaking by conducting comparative constitutional studies, evaluating the effectiveness of amendment procedures, and generating empirical data that inform constitutional reform debates. Furthermore, curriculum development in constitutional law, political science, and public administration should emphasize the relationship between constitutional design, democratic institutionalization, and governance outcomes. Academic institutions can also facilitate dialogue between scholars, policymakers, and practitioners through conferences, policy forums, and collaborative research initiatives. Such activities can enhance knowledge transfer and support the development of informed constitutional reform strategies. From a broader national development perspective, the findings suggest that effective constitutional amendment procedures serve as a foundation for political stability, democratic consolidation, and sustainable governance. Constitutional systems that encourage political consensus, maintain judicial oversight, incorporate federal participation, and operate within strong democratic institutions are better positioned to respond to social, economic, and political challenges. By adopting the recommendations derived from this study, governments can create constitutional environments that support institutional resilience, protect democratic values, and facilitate peaceful adaptation to changing societal needs. Ultimately, the study contributes to evidence-based decision-making by providing empirical guidance for constitutional reform processes and offering practical strategies for strengthening democratic governance in Pakistan, India, and other emerging democracies facing similar constitutional challenges.

8. Research Limitation

While this study provides valuable empirical insights into the constitutional amendment procedures of Pakistan and India, several limitations should be acknowledged to ensure a balanced interpretation of the findings. These limitations do not diminish the significance of the research; rather, they provide context for understanding the scope of the results and identifying areas for future investigation.

One limitation relates to the sample and sampling strategy employed in the study. The research utilized a sample of 400 respondents drawn from a target population consisting of academics, researchers, legal professionals, public administrators, postgraduate students, and members of civil society. Although these respondents possessed relevant knowledge and experience regarding constitutional and political issues, the use of purposive sampling may limit the extent to which the findings can be generalized to the broader populations of Pakistan and India. The perspectives captured in the study primarily reflect informed and professionally engaged individuals rather than the views of all citizens. Consequently, while the findings provide important insights into expert perceptions of constitutional amendment procedures, caution should be exercised when extending the results to wider public opinion. A second limitation concerns the methodological approach adopted in the research. The study employed a quantitative, cross-sectional design that collected data at a single point in time. While this approach was appropriate for examining relationships among the selected variables and testing the proposed conceptual framework, it does not allow for the observation of changes in constitutional perceptions and institutional dynamics over time. Constitutional amendment processes are often influenced by evolving political circumstances, judicial developments, and changing democratic conditions. As a result, the cross-sectional nature of the study limits the ability to establish long-term causal relationships and capture temporal variations in constitutional governance. Future longitudinal studies may provide a deeper understanding of how constitutional amendment procedures evolve in response to political and institutional developments.

Another limitation relates to the measurement of variables. The study relied on self-reported perceptions collected through a structured questionnaire using a Likert-scale measurement approach. Although reliability and validity analyses confirmed the quality of the measurement instrument, responses remain subject to individual interpretation, personal experiences, and perceptual biases. Respondents may have evaluated constitutional amendment procedures based on their professional backgrounds, political awareness, or institutional affiliations. Therefore, while the measurement instrument effectively captured informed perceptions regarding constitutional adaptability and democratic stability, the findings should be interpreted as reflecting respondent assessments rather than direct observations of constitutional performance. Incorporating qualitative interviews, case studies, or documentary analysis in future research could provide additional depth and triangulation. The time period within which the study was conducted also represents a limitation. Constitutional amendment procedures and democratic institutions operate within dynamic political environments that are influenced by contemporary events, judicial decisions, governmental reforms, and constitutional debates. The findings therefore reflect perceptions and institutional conditions existing during the period of data collection. Changes in political leadership, constitutional reforms, judicial interpretations, or democratic developments occurring after the completion of the study may influence the relevance and applicability of some findings. Accordingly, future studies conducted at different points in time may produce variations in results due to changing constitutional and political contexts. Geographical scope presents another limitation of the research. Although the study focused on a comparative analysis of Pakistan and India, data collection was concentrated within

a specific regional context and involved respondents primarily associated with Pakistan, alongside a smaller proportion of participants from India and other countries. While the comparative framework was theoretically grounded and relevant to both constitutional systems, the geographical concentration of respondents may have influenced the perceptions reflected in the data. Consequently, the findings should be interpreted within the context of the selected sample and may not fully capture the diversity of constitutional perspectives present across all regions, provinces, and states of both countries. Future comparative studies involving broader and more geographically diverse samples could strengthen the external validity of the findings.

A further limitation concerns the selection of variables included in the conceptual framework. The study focused specifically on Legislative Majority Requirements, Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments, Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics, Political Consensus, and Democratic Institutionalization. While these variables were selected based on extensive theoretical and empirical literature and demonstrated significant explanatory power, constitutional amendment processes are influenced by numerous additional factors. Variables such as political culture, public participation, electoral systems, leadership characteristics, media influence, historical legacies, and socio-economic conditions were beyond the scope of the present study. The exclusion of these factors does not invalidate the findings; however, it suggests that the proposed model represents one important perspective rather than an exhaustive explanation of constitutional amendment dynamics.

Despite these limitations, the study maintains strong methodological rigor through the use of validated measurement scales, comprehensive reliability and validity assessments, Structural Equation Modeling, mediation analysis, and moderation analysis. The research offers a robust empirical examination of constitutional amendment procedures and provides meaningful contributions to the fields of comparative constitutional studies, political science, and democratic governance. The identified limitations should therefore be viewed as opportunities for future research to expand upon the present findings and further enrich scholarly understanding of constitutional adaptability and democratic stability in diverse political contexts.

9. Future Direction

The findings of this study provide a strong foundation for future scholarly inquiry into constitutional amendment procedures, constitutional adaptability, and democratic stability. Although the present research successfully examined the effects of Legislative Majority Requirements, Role of Federal Units in Amendment Approval, Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendments, Political Party Fragmentation and Coalition Politics, Political Consensus, and Democratic Institutionalization within a comparative framework involving Pakistan and India, several avenues remain available for further theoretical and empirical exploration.

Future research may extend the geographical scope of the study by conducting broader cross-country comparisons involving constitutional democracies from different regions of the world. Comparative investigations including countries such as the United States, Canada, Germany, Australia, South Africa, and Brazil could provide valuable insights into how constitutional amendment procedures operate under different political, legal, and institutional environments. Such studies would help determine whether the relationships identified in the present research are universally applicable or context-specific. Expanding comparative analysis across established democracies, emerging democracies, and transitional political systems would significantly enhance the generalizability of constitutional governance theories. Future scholars should also consider adopting longitudinal research designs to examine how constitutional amendment procedures evolve over time. The present study employed a cross-sectional approach, which captured perceptions at a specific point in time. Longitudinal studies could investigate how changes in judicial activism, political party systems, democratic institutionalization, and

constitutional reform processes influence constitutional adaptability and democratic stability across different political periods. Such research would be particularly useful for understanding the long-term consequences of constitutional amendments and the evolving role of constitutional institutions in responding to political and societal transformations.

Another promising direction involves the incorporation of additional explanatory variables that were beyond the scope of the current study. Future researchers may examine the influence of political culture, public participation, civil society engagement, media freedom, leadership effectiveness, electoral systems, constitutional literacy, and citizen trust in institutions. These factors may provide additional explanatory power and contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of constitutional amendment dynamics. The inclusion of such variables could lead to the development of more sophisticated theoretical models capable of explaining constitutional adaptability and democratic stability from multiple institutional and societal perspectives.

Future studies may also explore alternative mediating and moderating mechanisms. While the present research identified Political Consensus as a mediator and Democratic Institutionalization as a moderator, future investigations could examine variables such as political trust, institutional legitimacy, governance effectiveness, constitutional culture, judicial independence, and public confidence in democratic institutions. Exploring multiple mediators and moderators simultaneously through advanced structural models could provide a deeper understanding of the mechanisms through which constitutional amendment procedures influence democratic outcomes.

Methodologically, future research could benefit from adopting mixed-methods approaches that combine quantitative analysis with qualitative inquiry. In-depth interviews with constitutional experts, judges, legislators, policymakers, and political leaders could complement survey-based findings and provide richer contextual explanations for constitutional reform processes. Comparative case studies of major constitutional amendments in Pakistan and India could further illuminate the political negotiations, institutional conflicts, and consensus-building processes that quantitative methods may not fully capture. Such methodological triangulation would strengthen the validity and depth of future constitutional research. An innovative avenue for future research involves examining the impact of digital governance and technological transformation on constitutional amendment processes. As governments increasingly utilize digital consultation mechanisms, electronic participation platforms, and technology-driven legislative systems, researchers may investigate how digital democratic tools influence political consensus, constitutional legitimacy, and citizen engagement in constitutional reform. This emerging area remains underexplored within constitutional studies and offers substantial opportunities for theoretical and practical contributions.

Future scholars may also investigate the relationship between constitutional amendment procedures and broader governance outcomes such as political stability, economic development, investment confidence, social cohesion, and conflict management. Such interdisciplinary research would help demonstrate how constitutional design influences national development objectives beyond legal and political dimensions. Understanding these broader implications could provide policymakers with stronger evidence regarding the developmental significance of constitutional reform strategies. Another original research opportunity lies in conducting comparative analyses of constitutional amendment success and failure across different political systems. Researchers could develop constitutional amendment effectiveness indices and evaluate the conditions under which constitutional reforms succeed, fail, or produce unintended consequences. Such studies could contribute significantly to constitutional governance literature by identifying best practices and institutional conditions associated with successful constitutional adaptation. Future investigations may further explore generational and stakeholder differences in

perceptions of constitutional reform. Comparative studies involving legislators, judges, academics, civil society representatives, legal practitioners, political party officials, and ordinary citizens could reveal how different groups perceive constitutional amendment procedures and democratic stability. Such research would provide valuable insights into constitutional legitimacy and public acceptance of constitutional change.

Finally, future research should continue developing integrated theoretical frameworks that bridge constitutional law, political science, public administration, and governance studies. The incorporation of emerging concepts such as democratic resilience, constitutional innovation, adaptive governance, institutional trust, and constitutional sustainability may generate new perspectives on how constitutions can remain both stable and responsive in rapidly changing societies. By pursuing these directions, future scholars can expand the boundaries of comparative constitutional research and contribute to the development of more effective, inclusive, and democratically legitimate constitutional systems across diverse national contexts.

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